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“Love is blind, and lovers cannot see”:1 Resisting Copyright’s Romance 
Fiona Macmillan 




As an area of academic study copyright has always been vaguely romantic.  Perhaps attracted by the 
two dominant justificatory discourses of copyright law, it has tended to be populated by scholars with 
a particular interest in the creative or cultural aspects of the subject matter with which it is concerned.  
Amongst those prone to be receptive to this type of thing, who would not have been seduced by the 
attractions of the incentive-based justification, with its promises of ever more cultural production and 
innovation?  And, as for the natural rights theory, the life-affirming qualities of the idea of recognising 
the special status of acts of cultural production and those who engage in them is more or less evident.  
Critical engagement with copyright law has, however, exposed its uncertain and compromised 
relationship with a range of concepts that inform this justificatory discourse.  The copyright treatment 
meted out to ideas around things such as authorship, creativity and cultural production – not to 
mention their specific instantiations in literature, drama, dance, art, music and film - have been 
exposed in a probing, excellent and often interdisciplinary literature that inevitably dowses overly 
romantic sensibilities.2  This body of literature addresses, in varying ways and degrees, the mismatch 
between concepts and conditions of creativity and cultural production, on the one hand, and their 
mutant second life according to copyright law, on the other.  It also critically reflects on the 
consequences of copyright’s legal identity as a property right and the way in which the occidental 
framing of the property concept impacts on creativity and cultural production globally.  However, it 
was perhaps the emergence of a literature on the political economy of copyright3 that did most to 
expose its ugly underbelly and the way in which the romantic discourse of copyright has been 
corrupted by its engagement with the capitalist system.  The ensuing debate between copyright 
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maximalists and copyright minimalists (and even abolitionists)4 has been played out on a legal turf 
that is substantially imbricated with the values of this system. 
At the same time and running parallel to these debates, copyright as a legal construct has been 
appropriated into substantial engagements with other legal constructs and regimes.  This engagement, 
precisely because it calls - in often contradictory ways – on particular aspects of the copyright legal 
regime, provides fertile empirical ground on which to reflect on the debates over the meaning of 
copyright’s life and work.  And perhaps also allows us to predict the possible futures of copyright.  
With a view to obtaining these sorts of insights, and without having any confidence at this point in 
the likely success of the enterprise, this essay considers the relationship of the copyright regime with 
the regimes of international trade, cultural rights and cultural heritage.  The aim is to consider how 
these various sub-systems of law, all having a substantial life at the level of international law, interact 
with the copyright sub-system, which embodies one of the oldest property rights systems recognised 
in international law.5  In order to frame this analysis, the article first considers the location of these 
various regimes within the international legal order, and then proceeds to comment on copyright’s 
various regime entanglements. 
 
II International law as systemically divided 
The current international legal order, which has emerged since the end of the Second World War, 
embraces a kind of schism between public international law and international economic law.  The 
United Nations organizations, which form the framework for public international law, arose from the 
Dumbarton Oaks negotiations.  The institutions of international economic law emerged from the 
Bretton Woods negotiations, which drew up the charters of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the International Fund for Reconstruction and Development (which became the World Bank), and the 
International Trade Organization.  Despite being the progeny of Franklin D Roosevelt’s “one-
worldism”, the International Trade Organization never came into existence.6  However, it 
metamorphosed into the 1947 version of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and 
was, accordingly, a precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO).  From the beginning, the 
mandates of these two systems of international law were distinct.  The Bretton Woods institutions 
were to manage international economic relations, while the Dumbarton Oaks institutions were to 
manage the international political order.  As part of this mandate, the Dumbarton Oaks institutions 
have taken charge of what have been described as “state-making and war-making” functions.7 In 
addition to this, the system of public international law that has been built up around the Dumbarton 
Oaks institutions has purported to establish international standards in a variety of areas such as the 
protection of human rights, the environment and cultural heritage. 
This bifurcation of international law along the lines of the putative division between the political and 
the economic appears to be rooted in the origins of the Westphalia System.  The principle that quarrels 
between sovereigns did not implicate non-combatant civilians was built into the Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648.8  As a consequence, the treaties that built upon the Settlement of Westphalia abolished trade 
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barriers and sought to protect the rights of private enterprise to trade across state borders, even during 
times of war or other political turmoil.  Arrighi remarks that “[t]his reorganization of political space 
in the interest of capital accumulation marks the birth not just of the modern inter-state system, but 
also of capitalism as world system”.9  It is true that the economic freedoms of Westphalia were not 
observed during the period of political turmoil and violence marked by the Napoleonic Wars.  They 
were, however, restored in the Settlement of Vienna of 1815 and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle of 
1818.10  Similarly, after the First and Second World Wars “the United States first became hegemonic 
by leading the inter-state system towards the restoration of the principles, norms and rules of the 
Westphalia System, and then went on to govern and remake the system it had restored”.11 
From their inception, little was provided in the way in legal linkage between the Bretton Woods and 
Dumbarton Oaks institutions.  Nominally, the Bretton Woods institutions were established within the 
UN system,12 but the IMF and World Bank have in practice always been independent from it.  
Interestingly, however, the proposed Charter of the International Trade Organization did allow a 
member aggrieved by an International Trade Organization decision to seek an advisory opinion from 
the International Court of Justice, the decision of which would be binding on the International Trade 
Organization.  This attempt at a legal interface between the ordering of the international economic 
and political systems did not, however, survive the demise of the International Trade Organization.13 
Despite the legal separation of the two regimes, their institutions and activities have a clear, if 
changing, interrelationship.  The issue of international environmental regulation is a good example 
of the formal legal divide and substantive overlap that pervades the relationship between international 
economic law and public international law.14  This is not just because of the potential for conflict 
between the WTO multilateral trade agreements and the obligations imposed on states under the 
various multilateral environmental agreements.15  It is also because the issue of international 
environmental regulation cuts across the areas of economic and political management of international 
relations.16  Similar claims might be made with respect to the protection of human rights, including 
cultural rights.  At the international level, human rights concerns have traditionally been seen as a 
preserve of the Dumbarton Oaks system.  However, it is increasingly evident that they are raised not 
only in the context of the international management of the political order, but also in relation to the 
international management of the economic order.17 
At its broadest, the attempt of the international system to divide the indivisible, with its implicit denial 
that the economic is part and parcel of the political, has proved a very effective weapon in suppressing 
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and resisting political contestation.  This might be, in part, because especially in the neo-liberal period 
the location, or relocation, of legal questions in the realm of the economic tends to depoliticize them 
on the basis that they are somehow part of an unquestionable “scientific” economic order.18  However, 
I suggest that the depoliticization authorized by law is more profound and subtle than that authorized 
by economics.  This is because one result of the divided international legal system is that the space 
of contestation between the two systems, the space where parts of each system come into real conflict 
with each other, is never seen by the eye of the law.  The strange history of intellectual property law 
generally, and copyright specifically, in this bifurcated system of international law provides a good 
example of this effect, pursuant to which dissonance is ignored and political contestation is 
suppressed.  While intellectual property law now seems firmly ensconced on the international 
economic law side of the equation, it had - and to some extent continues to have - a life that falls on 
both sides of the systemic divide. 
 
III International trade regime 
More than twenty years after the birth of the WTO and its (in)famous Agreement on the Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), it’s easy to forget that, prior to the 
explicit opening of the fissure in international law caused by the birth of the WTO, international law 
in the area of intellectual property was the exclusive preserve of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, a United Nations instrumentality.  The relocation of intellectual property law within 
the WTO system may have amounted to a small scale tsunami in international law terms but it was 
also, of course, an acknowledgement of the ever-increasing significance of intellectual property rights 
in international trade and investment.  This was not something reflected in the relevant international 
legal instruments prior to the WTO.  The foundational Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (1886) makes copyright sound like something enjoyed only by authors of creative 
works; and although the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (1961) protects corporations investing in the creation 
or distribution of copyright works, the habit of referring to them as enjoying “related rights” created 
some rhetorical distance from the heartland of copyright.  Nevertheless, the evidence of the 
widespread ownership, trade and investment in copyright interests by the multinational media and 
entertainment corporations was there for anyone who wanted to see it. 
Building on the broad and substantial base provided by the exclusive property rights conferred on 
them by their copyright portfolios, taking advantage of the horizontal integration of their business 
interests across a wide range of diverse cultural outputs, and organising themselves internationally 
through a corporate group structure, a small number of multinational corporate interests came to 
dominate the global market for the creation and distribution of certain forms of cultural production.19  
As I have argued extensively elsewhere, this dominance, which is particularly marked in (but not 
limited to) the music and film industries, has produced a range of undesirable cultural and political 
effects.20  These effects include things like the global homogenisation of cultural output, the creation 
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of a monological corporate culture, the repression of acts of resistance against such a culture, the 
silencing of alternative discourses, and the general constriction of creativity and innovation.  My 
argument has never been that this is some type of global conspiracy (although it might be), but rather 
that these are simply the effects of a system of property rights that privileges the investment in certain 
forms of creativity over other non-market values inherent in those creative forms.  Certain aspects of 
copyright law have been particularly significant in this context.  The fact that copyright conveys 
rivalrous private property rights is clearly of central importance, but the methods by which these 
rights can be obtained and their scope are also critical to understanding copyright’s relationship to 
investment and capital accumulation.  For instance, not only do the corporate commodifiers in the 
media and entertainment industries obtain copyright interests by assignment from the authors who, 
according to copyright law, are the first owners of copyright, but they are also granted ownership 
rights in some forms of cultural products from the outset as if they were authors.  And then, the scope 
of the copyright interest is broad, while the various and exceptions and defences to its exercise seem 
to be subject to a continuing contraction. 
Many people who clung to, or were convinced by, the romantic conception of copyright law only 
seemed to notice this state of affairs after the immense power of these corporations was put to the 
task of reshaping international law to reflect their interests.21  Almost as if the announcement of the 
relocation of the “trade-related” aspects of intellectual property law, including even copyright, into 
the newly created WTO regime, revealed an aspect of the life of intellectual property that had 
previously been concealed.  This is not to say, however, that this relocation did not have significant 
effects.  Since the arrival of the TRIPs Agreement, intellectual property law has been explicitly 
configured as being about “rights” in relation to “trade”.  For those who would want to see copyright 
bolstering the fundamental role of cultural products as a having a value in their own right, rather than 
a purely instrumental role, some comfort might be taken from the fact that the reference to “trade-
related aspects” suggests that there may be some other aspects - but it is cold comfort.  Not only is 
the TRIPs Agreement the dominant normative instrument of international intellectual property law, 
its location within the suite of WTO agreements means that it is an integral part of a powerful system 
of international economic law-making.22  These two aspects of the TRIPs Agreement are, of course, 
intrinsically related.  The systemic power and concomitant strong enforcement procedures of the 
WTO are a large part of the reason that the TRIPs Agreement has acquired the ability to define the 
parameters of intellectual property law discourse.  Consequently, the TRIPs Agreement has provided 
an authoritative consolidation and normalisation of the pre-existing real life of intellectual property 
law generally and copyright law specifically.  And that real life is not only as a self-declared “trade-
related” right, but even more as an investment right.23 
The copyright provisions of the TRIPs Agreement are, more or less, the same as those that were 
already laid down in the Berne Convention.24  This means that there are not enormous differences 
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22 See further D Kennedy, “The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy: John Jackson and the Field of International 
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TRIPs Agreement, Arts 10-14 add some further obligations.  In particular, Arts 11 and 14.4 broaden the exclusive rights 
between the legal framework of international copyright law before and after TRIPs.  Yet, as is well-
known, context is everything.  The reification of intellectual property rights as trade rights, capable 
of enforcement through a system of trade retaliation, emphasises certain aspects of the international 
copyright landscape at the expense of others.  This perception is reinforced by two further factors.  
The first is that the TRIPs Agreement has shown itself to be a useful uniform basis upon which to 
negotiate bilateral investment treaties, which may strengthen the oligopolistic nature of the market 
for cultural goods and services.25  This gives further weight to my suggestion above that the TRIPs 
Agreement might be even better characterised as an investment agreement than as a trade 
agreement.26  The second factor reinforcing the nature of the change in the international copyright 
landscape was that the interpretation and enforcement of international copyright law was vouchsafed 
to trade law experts. 
I do not wish to linger too long on the effects which the TRIPs Agreement has had on the international 
trajectory of copyright law.  However, the early example of the WTO panel in US – Section 110(5) 
of US Copyright Act27 is perhaps worth mentioning as an illustration of the new life of copyright law 
in the hands of those who know little about its old life.  This case considered the so-called three step 
test for the validity of national copyright exceptions in Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement.28  This is 
clearly of central importance in the present context since the exceptions, the scope of which has 
progressively diminished, are the key to establishing some sort of balance between the exercise of the 
rivalrous private property right of the copyright owner and important objectives, such as the 
promotion and diffusion of cultural creativity and innovation.  This dispute offered the opportunity 
for the WTO panel to reflect on the legitimate policy purposes of national exceptions to the rights of 
the copyright holder, which might be thought to include, for example, include the need to balance the 
interests of copyright owners and users in certain cases.  Needless to say, this opportunity was not 
seized by the panel.  Not only did the panel ignore Article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement itself, which 
speaks about intellectual property rights being used in a manner which is “conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations”, it also overlooked the whole concept 
of copyright as a balance between rights and obligations. 29  The loss of any discourse about balance 
in copyright law obviously enlarges copyright’s potential as a tool of cultural domination and 
homogenisation. 
Despite this unashamedly negative account of the relocation of international copyright law into the 
regime of international economic law, it must be conceded that it has had an important and positive 
political effect.  This is because it was a key moment in raising awareness about the real nature of 
intellectual property rights, including copyright.  It may be true, as I suggest above, that the divided 
nature of the international legal regime tends to suppress political contestation, but at least in the case 
of intellectual property law, its passage from one side of the regime to the other has provoked a period 
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of prolonged debate that, so far as copyright is concerned, often goes under the description of the 
“copyright wars”.  While the sparking of this debate also owes something to the punitive effects of 
the TRIPs Agreement regime (and the WTO) on the so-called developing world, it has generated a 
serious inquisition into the general nature and effects of intellectual property rights.  The copyright 
wars, not unlike other multi-party conflicts, offer a rich array of strategic positions.  I hope, however, 
it is not too simplistic to say that these positions might be captured under four, not necessarily discrete, 
banners.  These are: copyright as a fundamental property right; copyright as a fundamental cultural 
right; copyright as a means to encourage innovation; and, copyright as a self-defeating restriction on 
creativity, innovation, free speech and participation in cultural life.  What this means is that 
skirmishes in the copyright wars have tended to take the copyright debate back into the territory of 
public international law, or at least to pull it to and fro between its manifestations on both sides of the 
divide between public international law and international economic law.  This is well-illustrated by 
the recently reinvigorated debate around copyright and cultural rights. 
 
IV Cultural Rights 
At this point, in the unlikely case that they are not already evident, I should nail at least some of my 
own colours to the mast.  In my view one of the most pernicious, intellectually unjustified and 
dangerous discourses in intellectual property scholarship and commentary is that which claims that 
the Article 15(1)(c) of the UN Charter on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, requiring the 
protection of authors’ moral and material rights, gives a human rights justification for the grant of 
intellectual property protection.30  This is particularly so when it is accompanied by a discourse that 
claims a human right to property.  Nevertheless, this characterization of intellectual property 
continues to be widespread, especially with respect to copyright and especially at the levels of 
international law and policymaking.  This is so even though a moment’s serious consideration of 
Article 15(1)(c), and of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from which it is 
drawn, makes it clear that there is nothing in these provisions that mandates, or even authorises, the 
protection of the cultural rights to which they relate through the proprietary apparatus of copyright.  
This claim has, however, been important in attempting to give copyright a life, and an unassailable 
one at that, on the public international law side of the divided international law system. 
The suggestion that copyright is a fundamental human right, in the form of a cultural right, has also 
recently been rejected in the Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights on 
Copyright Policy and the Right to Science and Culture31  Not only should copyright not be conceived 
of as a cultural right, according to the Report, but it also should be understood as interfering with the 
realization of cultural rights.  Emanating as it does from such an impeccable source within the public 
international law constellation, the Report is worth pausing over.  It commences in a straightforward 
fashion, noting that despite the fact that they cover the same subject matter (science and culture) “two 
influential paradigms of international law – intellectual property and human rights – have evolved 
largely separately”.32  As private rights over intellectual property become ever stronger, the Report 
notes, the tension between these two regimes has increased.  According to the Report, some of the 
consequences and/or risks of this separate evolution are: the privatization of human knowledge; the 
restriction of artistic and creative freedom; the squeezing of the public domain with the consequent 
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reduction in the capacity of everyone to take part in cultural life; restrictions on the general right to 
freedom of expression, including the right to receive information; and a failure to recognise the 
“unique concerns of indigenous peoples”.33  The Report observes that “human knowledge” is “a 
global public good and ... States should guard against promoting the privatization of knowledge to an 
extent that deprives individuals of opportunities to take part in cultural life”.34  With respect to artistic 
freedom, the Report notes that the width of the exclusive rights afforded to copyright holders enables 
them “to monetize a wide variety of uses and to prevent adaptations they find objectionable.  
Consequently, the creative freedom of other artists to build upon and adapt existing cultural works 
may become dependent upon their ability to pay a licensing fee”.35  Similarly, on the question of the 
contracting of the public domain or cultural commons, the Report draws attention to the way in which 
the long duration of the copyright interest may interfere with the protection of “a vibrant public 
domain of shared cultural heritage, from which all creators are free to draw”.36 
However, the Report’s punchiest sections are directed at issues arising from the presence and 
activities of the media and entertainment corporations in the copyright context.  The Report goes 
behind the figure of the copyright owner, drawing the critical distinction between the owner of the 
copyright interest, often a corporation, and the author of the copyright work.  It important to 
understand that the interests of these two figures may be not only different but “opposing”,37 says the 
Report, and that the contractual relations between them regarding commercialization and distribution 
of works “are often marked by an imbalance of power between the parties”.38  Applying its critical 
human rights eye, it notes that the economic interests of corporate rights holders “do not enjoy the 
status of human rights”.39  Accordingly, “[f]rom the human rights perspective, copyright policy and 
industry practices must be judged by how well they serve the interests of human authors, as well as 
the public’s interest in cultural participation”.40  The Report criticises, in particular, the overwhelming 
influence of the corporate sector in the political economy of international copyright law making, 
which it describes as a “democratic deficit in international policymaking on copyright” (para 19).41 
As should be evident from the foregoing sections of this article, none of this is particularly new.  But 
its source is interesting.  Of course, there are many respects in which the Report could have gone 
further.42  And there are contradictory moments when it ascribes values to copyright law, drawn from 
the fundamental rights discourse, that seem misplaced.  The Report might have noted, making a 
logical development of its own arguments, that the creation of private property rights over cultural 
products is part of a system designed to make those products liquid and that the purpose of making 
culture – or any other asset - liquid is to facilitate investment.  In other words, the design of the system 
favours the accumulation of capital by those best able to harvest profits off that accumulation.  In the 
same context, the Report might have also considered the significance of the fact that the media and 
entertainment corporations, which so successfully harvest profits off capital accumulation, are 
insiders in the copyright system.  This is because, as already noted above, they become copyright 
owners, not only because they have taken some form of assignment or licence from a human being 
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in circumstances of uneven bargaining power (or not), but because they have been granted copyright 
by operation of law from the outset as if they were authors.  In other words, corporate systems of 
capital accumulation in relation to the creation and distribution of certain cultural forms are central 
to the copyright system.  When the copyright system is seen in this light, one might reasonably query 
the nature of what the Report describes as “the social and human values inherent in copyright law”,43 
or “the social function and human dimension of intellectual property”.44 
Of course, in referring to copyright this way, the Report is having its own romantic moment about 
copyright and the values that underlie it.  Perhaps it is also trying to revive a now somewhat neglected 
discourse that seeks produce a type of transubstantiation between the continental system of authors’ 
rights and copyright.  Romanticism about the former is not necessarily misplaced.  It is, of course, 
true that the system of authors’ rights derives its fundamental justification from the notion that an 
author’s personality is embedded in the work,45 but this theory has very little purchase in the now 
internationally dominant Anglo-American concept of copyright.46  That concept has traditionally 
justified the allocation of monopoly rights to creators and distributors of creative works on the basis 
that they will incentivise such creation and distribution.  This has, nevertheless (contrary to the type 
of romanticism at issue here), involved it in the prioritisation of the accumulation of investment 
capital over “social values” or “social functions”.  It is not so much here that I want to criticise the 
idea that copyright could or should have these values and functions,47 but rather to focus on the 
arguably tenuous relationship with reality that such claims have when considered in the light of 
copyright’s history and political economy. 
 
V Cultural Heritage 
For me one of the particular examples of this misreading of copyright is exposed in the persistent 
attempts to link copyright with the protection of cultural heritage.48  This question is addressed by the 
Report in relation to the cultural heritage of Indigenous Peoples, a context which will be 
overwhelmingly familiar to all copyright scholars.  The Report cites the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIPs),49 Article 31(1), which seeks to assure Indigenous 
Peoples “the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions”.  For reasons that are 
surely located in the historic and continuing injustice meted out to Indigenous Peoples – including 
the forced dispossession and misappropriation of their lands and culture, and their political 
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marginalisation and disempowerment - the Report endorses the approach of Article 31(1).  And it 
urges the observance of the values and principles embodied in the 1995 United Nations Guidelines 
for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples,50 especially that “indigenous peoples’ 
ownership and custody of their heritage must continue to be collective, permanent and inalienable; 
that the free and informed consent of the traditional owners be a precondition of any agreements for 
the recording, study, use or display of indigenous peoples’ heritage: and that concerned peoples be 
the primary beneficiaries of commercial application of their heritage”.51 
While in no way questioning the validity of the concern about the treatment of Indigenous Peoples 
that provides the context of this endorsement of both the 1995 Guidelines for the Protection of the 
Heritage of Indigenous Peoples and the 2007 DRIPs, one might wonder if the endorsement of Article 
31(1) of DRIPs is consistent with the general position of the Report rejecting the proposition that 
Article 15(1)(c) of the Charter on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (and/or Article 27(2) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights) mandates protection in the form of private property rights. 
Similarly, doubts might be raised about whether Article 31(1) is consistent with the idea of the 
protection of cultural heritage as a community right.  And, on this basis, even whether it is consistent 
with the 1995 United Nations Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 
cited in the Report.  It is not only that a form of private property protection is an inherently 
problematic way to protect what is said to be a community or collective right.52  It is also that 
protecting the cultural heritage of Indigenous Peoples through a private property device developed 
according to an understanding of creativity propounded by the ideals of the European enlightenment 
has the capacity and potential to change the shape of that heritage in ways that are not necessarily the 
consequence of the reflexive cultural practice that constitutes it.  Overall, it seems to me to be 
questionable that intellectual property rights can ever – or could ever be expected to - do the things 
that the 1995 UN Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous Peoples 
envisaged.53 
My scepticism on this front is, of course, shared neither by those who view copyright with rose-tinted 
glasses, having been fatally contaminated with the idea that it forms part of the discourse of cultural 
rights, nor by those who have some other political, strategic or institutional reason for continuing to 
assert copyright’s vibrant life as part of the public international side of international law.  In particular, 
position-taking by certain institutions of international law has been very significant in driving the 
direction of this debate.  As is well-known, for example, one of the strategies adopted by WIPO (a 
UN agency) in order to carve out a sphere of influence post-TRIPs is to continue to work on the 
question of the protection of Indigenous cultural heritage.  While the current state of this work 
acknowledges important differences between the protection of cultural heritage and the protection of 
intellectual property, the location this work in WIPO gives pause for thought.  One consequence of 
this location is that the concept of the heritage of Indigenous Peoples is organized around what might 
be described as an intellectual property “mentality”, which broadly reflects an equivalence between 
patents and traditional knowledge, on the one hand, and copyright and traditional cultural expressions, 
on the other.  Another international institutional example of equal, but more generalized concern, is 
the insistence of UNESCO, which has responsibility for promulgating international law on the 
protection of cultural heritage, in mixing up cultural heritage and copyright.  This confusion seems to 
have become particularly acute in the debate around the protection of intangible cultural heritage and 
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cultural diversity, which are the subject of protection in two (of its three) twenty first century 
conventions, the 2003 Convention on the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage and the 
2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity.  In part, this owes something 
to the ongoing question of the protection of the heritage of Indigenous Peoples and others to whom 
“folklore” might be thought to belong.54  However, it is also part of a more broad-based UNESCO 
discourse that seems to equate the protection of heritage with copyright – or, at least, does not seem 
to regard them as being in fundamental tension with each other.55  This, I think, is an error. 
This tendency to elide intellectual property rights and cultural heritage rights appears to owe at least 
something to the confusion provoked by their competing invocations of intangibility. Intellectual 
property rights, unlike cultural heritage rights, are never claims to tangible objects but rather claims 
to intangible rights (albeit claims that often implicate tangible objects).  Cultural heritage, on the other 
hand has awkward relationship to the distinction between the tangible and the intangible. While it 
applies to both, it is possible to exaggerate the significance of the distinction.  This is partly because 
what makes a tangible thing into cultural heritage is its intangible or symbolic association.56  While, 
at the same time, intangible cultural heritage generally has a tangible dimension.57  Even though the 
copyright and cultural heritage ideas of intangibility are different, the disorientation of the intangible 
realm seems to augment the dangers of confusing, eliding and overlapping cultural heritage and 
intellectual property.  So far as copyright and intangible cultural heritage is concerned, the tendency 
is particular acute because of obvious overlaps in the subject matter of their protection.   
Both concepts are strongly associated with the creative arts.  In the case of copyright one of the 
markers of the social acceptance of a practice as part of the creative arts in occidental society seems 
also to be the fact that that practice then came to be protected as a copyright work.58  On the part of 
cultural heritage, this long-term association59 is now clearly reflected in Article 2.2 of the Convention 
on Intangible Cultural Heritage.  This provision, which makes the overlap between the two concepts 
more or less obvious, provides specific instances of the sort of stuff that falls within the Convention’s 
general definition of intangible cultural heritage60 listed inclusively as follows: 
(a) oral traditions and expressions, including language as the vehicle of the intangible 
cultural heritage; 
(b) performing arts; 
(c) social practices, rituals and festive events; 
(d) knowledge and practices concerning nature and the universe; 
(e) traditional craftsmanship. 
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However, it is not only the case that this list explains the tendency to confuse the two concepts, it also 
suggests the potential for conflict between them.61  It is clear that part of what might be considered 
to be intangible cultural heritage falls outside the copyright net because, even if its “authors” are 
identifiable, any copyright interest will have disappeared into the mist of the copyright duration rules.  
However, in the context of at least some things that fall within the idea of more contemporary cultural 
heritage, the conflict between their identity as intangible cultural heritage and their character as a 
copyright work is alive and well.  However, the central tension, and fundamental difference between 
the two concepts - that while cultural heritage is something that “belongs” to a community,62 
intellectual property including copyright is a rivalrous form of private property – means that these 
two systems involve two very different ways of expressing value. 
In the neo-liberal period there is a tendency for everything to be subjected to what has been described 
as “total market thinking”.63  Seeing the world through the spectacles of the neo-liberal framework 
leads to the conclusion that value can only be expressed through the market, which means that it can 
only be expressed in the form of a commodity.  When we talk about the commodification of artistic 
works then the relevant instrument of commodification is almost always copyright because it is 
copyright that turns the relevant creative forms into private property.  It is, therefore, critically 
important to distinguish between the fundamentally different concepts of not only copyright and 
cultural heritage, but also of the market and the community.  This is because these are the two contexts 
in which copyright and cultural heritage, respectively, express and control the meaning of value. So 
while copyright as a private property right locates all relationships in the context of the market, the 
context of cultural heritage relationships is the community, of which the market forms a part but does 
not (or should not) control the whole. 
In the world of total market thinking formal systems of private property rights such as copyright enjoy 
particular prestige.  The more valuable the right in the marketplace the greater the prestige.  In terms 
of the relationship between intellectual property and cultural heritage, it seems clear that cultural 
property/heritage has suffered from the ensuing prestige deficit, with a consequent impact on the way 
it is protected under international law.64   However, if we want to have cultural practices that resist 
this reduction of everything to its value in the market, then we also need to find a device that resists 
the commodification, or creeping propertization, of everything and proposes an alternative basis for 
expressing and controlling value.  At the moment, the best bet we have for this form of resistance is 
a more fully articulated concept of cultural heritage, which expresses and controls value according to 
the norms and identity of a community and not according to the market value of private property 
rights.  But what would this more fully articulated legal concept of cultural heritage be?  My 
suggestion is that it would be one that protected cultural heritage from the exercise of private property 
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rights, including private property rights in the form of copyright.  This is, however, the very thing 
that the concept of cultural heritage contained in the UNESCO Conventions does not do. 
One of the particularly strange results of the saturating effect of the intellectual property system is 
our acceptance, as Slaughter argues, of a state affairs in which we in the global north have intellectual 
property and the rest of the world has cultural property.65  While Slaughter argues that the rest of the 
world suffers from the burdensomeness and lack of prestige arising from this state of affairs, it is 
worth also noting what a culturally impoverishing idea this is for the global north.  And, assuming 
that we in the global north do have some cultural heritage/property, should it not be a concern of all 
of us that our heritage is not “collective, permanent and inalienable”, and that we are not afforded the 
opportunity to consent to the “recording, study, use or display” of our heritage?66  Are we really 
supposed to be happy with the idea that when elements of our own heritage are privatised by large 
media and entertainment corporations we have to pay to enjoy, use or re-use it, with the result that 
that a large corporation is the “primar[y] beneficiar[y] of the commercial application” of our 
heritage?67  Do we think this is alright because we in the global north are all one big (although not 
happy) community.  One explanation of the elision of cultural heritage rights and intellectual property 
in the context of the rights of Indigenous Peoples under Article 31(1) of DRIPs is that the beneficiaries 
of both sets of rights are the same community.  But this surely cannot apply with respect to cultural 
heritage at a more general level.  The implicit idea that the law would regard me as being in 
community with Disney, so that when Disney privatises collective cultural heritage for its private 
profit there’s no problem, seems to me to be a bit of a problem. 
 
VI Conclusion: Where to now? 
A consideration of the relationship between copyright and cultural rights tends to suggest that 
copyright law, wherever it started in the bifurcated international law system, has well and truly passed 
over to the international economic law side of the equation.  It is clear, however, that it has significant 
impacts across the systemic divide.  And this, in legal terms, in one of the places where the central 
problem with which this article is concerned raises its head.  Since there are no legal mechanisms to 
connect the two sides of the divided system, since there is no court that sits at the apex of the system 
balancing rights arising on both sides of the divided system, the problem is that the eye of the law 
does not even see the problem.  However, the systemic blindness does not stop here.  It is almost as 
if, having determined (erroneously as it turns out) that copyright represents a way of protecting 
cultural rights and cultural heritage, the architects of the system have simply refused to see it for what 
it is.  It seems to me to be almost perverse that the one serious legal protection that could be offered 
to practices of intangible cultural heritage, protection from privatization, is one of the few things that 
neither of the two UNESCO Conventions says anything about.  As a result, the law itself makes no 
attempt to understand the relationship between the way is meaning is made in relation to the same 
cultural practices in the two different systems of intangible cultural heritage protection and 
intellectual property protection.  Consequently, unconstrained by any legally imposed attempt at 
balance or restraint, the transcendence of total market thinking in the neo-liberal period has prioritised 
private property rights and their market exploitation over the demands of cultural heritage 
communities.68  Current practices of cultural production - instead of expressing the identity, solidarity 
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and mutual obligations of community69 - are stymied and constrained by the deadweight of private 
property rights, often exercised not even by other members of the cultural heritage community but by 
the media and entertainment corporations who have commodified so much contemporary cultural 
output. 
In the face of the law’s incapacity to resolve problems in its divided system, and the related refusal 
on the part of those responsible for making law on either side of that system to see the true nature of 
the copyright system, we are left with a pressing political project.  It is of critical importance that 
attention continues to be drawn to the (unromantic) political economy of copyright.  While it may be 
discouraging that it took so long, some hope can be derived from the fact that aspects of this critical 
political economy analysis found their way into the Report of the special rapporteur in the field of 
cultural rights.  The fact that they got there at all in such a resistant international policy-making 
context makes the Report a welcome novelty in the international law discourse around copyright.  
The Report should, therefore be seen as opening up a political opportunity for further contestation.  
As much as it might be out of fashion in the neo-liberal period, being romantic about the liberatory 
possibilities of politics seems to me to be more sustainable than the long and dangerous romance that 
has been the basis of too much copyright scholarship and policy-making in the post-Berne Convention 
period. 
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